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Abstract 
Policymakers seeking to reduce reliance on single-occupant automobiles 
are giving serious consideration to methods to price roads during periods 
of congest ion and to increase the cost of parking. Such policies are 
intended to induce increases in carpooling and in the use of mass transit; 
however, they may have unintended consequences that counteract these 
goals in the long run. In particular, actual implementation of such 
policies may create differential price increases that affect the spatial 
competition for markets between firms located in the central city and those 
in the suburbs. Analyzing such policies using the spatial competition 
models of location theory reveals that they may create incentives/or long-
run changes in location that subvert the mode choice impact of the 
policies. Careful evaluation of alternatives, such as cashing out 
employer-provided parking, may allow for development of policies that 
achieve the desired mode-choice effects without generating adverse 
spatial competition effects. 
Key words: transportation economics, congestion pricing, parking policy, spatial 
competition 
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Since the 1960s, policymakers and academics have increasingly been considering 
pricing travel and/or parking as a means of reducing reliance on the automobile. The 
chief argument has been that if users pay the full cost of driving, they will be less likely 
to drive alone. A number of studies have looked at the feasibility and implications of 
road pricing (e.g., charging for vehicle miles traveled), and there has been more recent 
attention to the implications of using parking pricing as a policy tool. Recent work has 
examined using parking policies to attract auto users to transit, and questions about the 
economic effects of parking pricing have been addressed (1) . Much of the discussion of 
both road and parking pricing has involved the effect that pricing would have on choice 
of mode, with the expectation that higher costs would induce more use of transit and 
carpooling. However, this analysis is largely based on the assumption that travel origins 
and destinations are fixed and that these policies will affect only mode choice. Central 
business district (CBD) business interests have historically opposed pricing policies, 
although analysts and case study examples have suggested that core businesses will in 
fact benefit from the improved accessibility resulting from reductions in congestion (2) . 
Downtown business interests' concern is that higher charges will make the downtown 
location less attractive relative to suburban ones. This article looks at models of spatial 
competition to provide some insight into these concerns of the downtown business 
interests. 
Policy Context 
When the automobile initially became available to Americans, there was virtually 
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no regulation of its use. Over time, downtown business interests cited congestion as a 
major problem, but they were also reluctant to embrace restrictions on parking and other 
aspects of automobile us. Municipalities did not begin installing parking meters until the 
latter 1930s, and then only very cautiously, as business leaders continued to present 
strong opposition against any measure that might restrict customers ' access. Beginning in 
the late '40s and early '50s, policymakers began to frame the problem of downtown 
parking and congestion in terms of urban decline. The concern with competition from the 
growing suburbs-where parking supply was plentiful and fre~ompelled downtown 
decision-makers to see the increased provision of free off-street parking downtown as the 
key to alleviating congestion and increasing competitiveness. 
By the 1970s, transpo11ation policy began to be driven by two strong forces: 
central city economic competitiveness with the suburbs and a growing concern with 
energy and the environment. Policymakers began to consider a variety of transportation 
and parking management devices: carpooling, park-and-ride, and controll ing or even 
"capping" downtown parking supply. By the end of the 1980s, however, it was becoming 
increasingly apparent to policymakers that these and other "transpo11ation control 
measures" (TCMs) were not having a significant effect on automobile use in general and, 
from a federal viewpoint, on pollution levels in particular. Thus, policymakers began to 
consider additional means of affecting mode choice through "transportation demand 
management" (TDM) techniques that emphasized not only incentives for reducing auto 
travel, but disincentives for auto travel as well-including road and parking pricing (3). 
Many transportation economists and planners today continue to suggest that if 
Americans paid a higher price for automobile travel, particularly during peak travel 
5 
periods and in congested locations, they would not drive as much. Transportation 
economists have argued for road pricing for years, since drivers do not think about the 
time costs they impose on other drivers when they make the decision to drive on 
congested roads. In addition, most commuters do not face an explicit charge for parking 
at their place of employment. As Donald Shoup points out, the value of employer-paid 
parking is so substantial that it virtually "invites commuters to drive to work alone" (-1) . 
Transportation economist John Kain considers the effect of free parking for employees to 
be so significant that the elimination of employer-paid parking incentives should precede 
consideration of road pricing. He even suggests that eliminating parking subsidies might 
in many instances mitigate the need for road pricing at all (5). Anthony Downs favors 
market-priced parking over road pricing because it is easier to administer and because it 
does not pose as much a perceived threat to privacy (6). 
THE IMPACT OF CONGESTION PRICING AND P ARKING TAXES ON 
SP A T IAL COMPETITION 
Both congestion pricing and various policies to increase the cost of parking are 
expected to affect mode choice, but this is primarily a short-run consideration. Over 
longer periods of time, changes in the relative cost of getting to various locations could 
have substantial impact on the spatial distribution of activity. 
Parking and road taxes are location-based taxes. That is, unlike emissions fees, 
mileage-based fees, or gasoline taxes, they are connected to a specific place. When we 
consider the effect of location-based transportation taxes such as parking or road pricing, 
we need to include a consideration of spatial effects. In plain terms, the effect of a 
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location-based tax in the suburbs may differ markedly from the effect of a location-based 
tax in the central city, especially if the tax differs in magnitude or coverage, as most road 
or parking pricing policies would. Unfortunately, models of the impact of transportation 
prices on mode share are much better developed than models of the impact of 
transportation prices on location choices. Hence, we can offer only illustrative 
possibilities and analysis of potential impacts at this point. 
Road, or congestion, pricing is expected to work best when the price is varied 
with the level of congestion. Further, because of the cost of monitoring congestion 
pricing, there is a good possibility that initial efforts would be limited in coverage to 
highly congested roads. This could easily result in a relatively higher cost increase for 
drivers trying to get into a downtown area than for drivers moving from suburb to suburb. 
In the short-run, this may not create much problem because the downtown locations are 
also likely to be better served by transit and more convenient for carpooling. However, 
over the longer term, the relative cost differential may affect location decisions. 
Parking policy is even more problematic than congestion pricing since most 
congestion pricing plans call for regional coverage, while many parking policy changes 
are Left to local governments. For example, some policymakers have considered using 
parking taxes as a funding source for improved transit service. Although the improved 
transit service would lower the cost of access for some, the higher parking taxes would 
increase it for others, and the net effect is not at all obvious. 
The full economic impact of a congestion pricing policy or a parking policy will 
depend on many factors. Our purpose is to illustrate how analysis of a specific policy 
could be extended to consider the long-run effects of parking and other transportation 
t 
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charges, and it is to a more in-depth discussion of that topic that this paper now turns. 
Location Theory 
There are two basic paradigms oflocation theory. One, refetTed to as the spatial 
competition, central place, or market area model, assumes different nodes of activity 
within a region, where each node competes with other nodes for resources and customers. 
The other paradigm, the monocentric or bid-rent model, assumes a central location that is 
the most desired of all locations within a region. In some cii-cumstances, the spatial 
competition model may be more appropriate than the monocentric model for analyzing 
the effects of transportation pricing in modern metropolitan regions. We briefly discuss 
these models and then present the different implications of each. 
The Spatial Competition Model 
The spatial competition model starts with the assumption of a featureless plain. 
with transportation costs equal in all directions. Economies of scale and agglomeration 
lead to concentrations of activity, but each activity location is characterized by its 
competition with other locations for resources and customers. From this basic model 
comes the hierarchical characterization of cities, with a regular pattern of nodes 
corresponding to different levels in the hierarchy (7). 
In this model , transportation costs substantially influence function. If a location 
has a transportation cost advantage, then it is more likely to become a higher-order node. 
Hence, 1811' century U.S. cities with access to waterways or railroads were higher order 
than cities that were otherwise similar but without such access. Also of importance. 
improvements in local transportation increased the resources and customers that could be 
T 
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served at a node and hence increased the market area boundary. In this characterization. 
both absolute transportation costs and transportation costs relative to competitors are 
important in determining size and function. While thi s model was largely developed to 
explain competition between urban areas, it can readily be adapted to look at competition 
within urban areas. For simplicity, we treat the case of one downtown firm and one 
suburban firm competing for customers within the region. 
A variety of competitive situations can exist between firms located downtown and 
those located in suburban areas. For our examples, we assume that firms located in the 
central city have relatively high production costs, due to the relatively high cost of land, 
labor. and so on. However, because these firms are centrally located and served by a 
relatively well-developed transportation network, transportation costs are relatively low. 
As a result, customers' and employees' cost of travel to the firm is relatively low. 
On the other hand, the situation is assumed to be reversed for a suburban firm, 
which may have relatively low production costs, due to the lower cost of land, labor, etc. 
However, the cost of travel for customers and employees may be higher because they 
may have to travel greater distances using less developed transport infrastructure than is 
the case for the central city location. 
Parking and congestion costs are considered to be part of a firm's production 
costs. If the costs are imposed on workers, then the firm must either absorb them or offer 
a higher wage in long-run equilibrium; and, if imposed on customers, then the delivered 
price of the output is effectively increased. Production costs and travel costs work 
together to determine the market area enjoyed by a firm under the assumption that 
customers buy from the firm offering the lowest delivered price. It is possible for a firm 
with lower transportation costs to have a market area that completely surrounds the 
market area of a competitor, and we will illustrate this later with an example. The key 
issue in the spatial competition model is how changes in costs affect the market areas for 
the two firms. 
The Bid-Rent Model 
The bid-rent model is the one typically used to characterize a metropolitan area. 
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It starts with the asswnption of a central location that is the most desired of locations 
within an area. All other locations are disadvantaged in proportion to their distance from 
this central location. This gives rise to the bid-rent model of urban form, which has 
everyone commuting to the center each work day and locations closer to the center 
always economizing on transpo1tation costs relative to those farther away (8). 
This model is illustrated by Figure 1. Bid-rent analysis focuses on the ability to 
access a central point and analyzes " bids," or willingness to pay, for locations at various 
distances from the desired central location. The highest bids occur at the center, since it 
is asswned that everyone wants to access this point. Since locations at greater distances 
require some expenditure of time and money to gain access, they are less valuable and the 
bids lower. The slope in the illustration is determined by per-mile transportation costs. 
When incremental transportation costs per mile are low, the slope is flatter, since bids 
will not go down as rapidly with distance. This tends to lead to low-density dispersed 
activity. High per-mile transportation costs lead to steep bid-rent curves to offset the 
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Figure l . Bid-rent curve. 
Differing Conclusions 
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The bid-rent characterization of a metropolitan area made some sense when radial 
mass transit was the primary method of commuting to work. However, the automobile 
has made transportation in all directions more feasible and has shifted the paradigm 
closer to that of the featureless plain assumed by the spatial competition model. In this 
case, there are hierarchical nodes (e.g., central city and suburban activity centers) that 
compete with one another based on their relative transportation cost advantage and their 
ability to draw both workers and customers. Relative transportation cost advantages 
become important determinants of success or failure, growth or decline. 
The two different paradigms explain much about the differences we see in the 
theoretical analysis of city location patterns and the practical concerns of business 
interests in the downtown area. The bid-rent model treats the downtown as the focal 
point of all activity and analyzes how changes in transportation cost affect the location 
decisions of those wishing to get to this prime location. This is the principal focus of 
analysis of scholars analyzing the impact of congestion pricing and related policies. 
11 
Using this model, Robert Solow and subsequent writers conclude that in the absence of 
congestion pricing, the urban area will be too dispersed (9) . Most such analyses also 
indicate that the optimal city will be denser and also have a larger total population (10). 
However, this conclusion is not unanimous. For example, John Yinger concludes t11at 
imposition of congestion pricing would lead to a denser urban area, but with a smaller 
population (11). A basic problem with these models is that they are too complex for 
analytic solutions. Hence, simplifying assumptions are made that then tend to influence 
the conclusions of the models. Although much insight can be gained from these models. 
they must also be treated with caution. In general, the models conclude that higher 
transportation prices will lead to greater density, but they are based on a presumption that 
the city center is the only activity point. 
Business interests tend to focus on the spatial competition model in their 
characterization of the effect of changes in transportation costs. They see the CBD as 
being in competition with a variety of other locations in the region for both customers and 
workers. Increases in transportation costs then prin1arily affect where people go to work 
and shop rather than where they locate. 
In reality, it is most likely that neither view is completely accurate as a 
representation of the relationship between transportation costs and the location of 
economic activity; however, both must be considered in evaluating the effect of changes 
in policy that affect transportation costs, since the city center still holds a preeminent 
position relative to other locations, even though it is also in strong competition with other 
locations. 
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Road Pricing in the Spatial Competition Paradigm 
The bid-rent model is the one typically used to analyze the impact of road pricing 
on urban form and land use. A standard analysis maintains that central locations are 
made more desirable by a pricing policy that would charge per vehicle mile traveled. The 
standard bid-rent model shows the higher cost of transportation leading to more 
centralization to reduce aggregate transportation costs for employees and customers. 
Looking at the CBD as being in competition with suburban locations for 
economic activity can provide a very different analysis of the impact of raising the cost of 
transportation. In the spatial competition case, this increase in cost may not work to the 
central city's advantage. It depends on whether costs are increased more for commuting 
to the central city or to the suburbs. If costs of automobile commuting to the suburbs rise 
by more than the cost of commuting to the central city, then the conclusions of the bid-
rent model are reinforced. However, most urban areas would be expected to have less 
congestion in the suburbs and many of the policies proposed to raise parking costs would 
have less impact on the suburban locations. Raising the cost of commuting to the CBD 
without raising the cost of commuting to the suburban locations will induce 
decentralization of activity. This will result in fewer people coming downtown rather 
than more. Hence, transit may capture a larger share of a smaller number of trips. The 
net impact of this may be to reduce the viability of mass transit as a commuting 
alternative to the automobile. 
In the spatial competition model, increasing the cost of transportation to a specific 
node has the effect of reducing the market area around that node. This reduction in 
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market area means that fewer resources are available for production and that fewer 
customers will find the location attractive. It is clear that many downtown business 
associations are concerned that congestion pricing or parking policies will raise the cost 
of commuting to the central city by more than the cost of commuting to the suburbs. To 
the extent that the modem urban area is a polycentric area of competing business nodes, 
any policy that raises cost in one node relative to others will cause that node to shrink 
relative to the others. 
An important but unanswered question is the degree to which the two models 
represent the situation in modem urban areas. If the central city is viewed as having 
some agglomeration advantage relative to other parts of the urban area, then the 
difference between the marginal and average cost of commuting is likely to be the largest 
for the CBD. In other words, if congestion is greatest near the CBD, the charges needed 
to promote efficient road usage would be highest for trips through these heavily 
congested areas. Hence, attempts to charge marginal rather than average cost will lead to 
a relative cost disadvantage for the CBD. 
On the other hand, if congestion is similar throughout the metropolitan area, a 
congestion charge would show up as a general increase in the cost of automobile 
commuting. This would make all automobile commuting relatively less attractive and 
transit commuting relatively more attractive. Then the policy may promote the CBD 
relative to its competitors. 
Policies that simply increase the cost of commuting to the downtown will clearly 
change relative location choices in the long run in a way that is not conducive to mass 
transit. However, there is also the question of what is done with any revenue raised by 
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policies related to congestion. Since most such policies will raise revenue, the possibility 
of using that revenue to offset the price disadvantage of the policy should not be 
discounted. Here is where the analysis of incidence (that is, which party bears the burden 
of the tax) becomes very important. For example, suppose that a congestion charge is 
imposed that varies with the level of congestion and the distance traveled. If this charge 
is borne entirely by workers, with no impact on central city employment, then those 
workers will have an incentive to move closer to the city. This is the standard analysis. 
But if the charge makes central city locations less desirable, employment may 
decentralize. 
In the latter case, the central city will be disadvantaged relative to the suburbs, but 
if the revenue from that tax is used to improve transit, the relative shift in favor of the 
CBD may more than offset any relative increase in the cost of automobile access. On the 
other hand, if the revenue is used to reduce al I taxes in the region, then the existing ta'< 
burden may determine a different net impact. In particular, if the taxes in the suburbs are 
reduced more than the taxes in the city, the shift in tax burden may reinforce the impact 
of the higher commuting costs. 
Illustrative Example of Spatial Effects of Parking Pricing 
This example is based on an urban area with a central city defined by strict 
geographic limits and a suburban area that extends to the point where value as farm land 
exceeds value for suburban uses. The cost of road construction and maintenance is 
financed by a gasoline tax initially. The gasoline tax can be modeled as a per-mile tax on 
automobile usage, and average tax burden is determined by miles driven. Alternative 
I S 
forms of congestion pricing or parking pricing can then be compared to the gasoline tax 
in terms of relative price of getting to different employment locations and average tax 
burden. 
A firm located in the central city may face high production costs due to the 
relatively high cost of land, labor, and so on. In Figure 2, this relatively high production 
cost is represented by the long vertical line. However, because the firm is centraUy 
located and served by a relatively well-developed transportation network, customers' cost 
of travel to the firm may be relatively low. These low transportation costs are represented 



















Figure 3. Market areas of central city fom (high production 
costs, low travel costs) and of suburban firm (low production 
costs, high travel costs). 
On the other hand, the situation may be reversed for a suburban firm, which 
would have relatively low production costs, due to the lower cost of land, labor, etc. 
However, the cost of travel for customers might be higher because the transport 
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infrastructure is less developed than is the case for the central city location, e.g., there is 
less mass transit. This suburban firm's situation, relative to that of the central city firm, is 
illustrated in Figure 3. Note that for the suburban firm, the vertical production cost line is 
much sho1ter, indicating a lower production cost, while the transport lines are much 
steeper, indicating higher travel costs. 
The dotted lines in Figure 3 indicate the boundaries of the suburban firm's market 
area. Customers located inside those boundaries will tend to prefer shopping at the 
suburban firm, because for them, that's where the total costs will be lowest. However, 
customers outside the suburban firm's market area will tend to choose the central city 
firm- again, because of lower total costs. 
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What happens, then, if the cost of parking is increased in the central city, but not 
in the suburban location? An increase in parking price will tend to increase both the cost 
of production as employees demand higher wages and the fixed cost of transportation for 
customers coming to the central city, but not for the suburbru1 firm. The effect of the 
increase in costs for the central city firm will be to lengthen the vertical line representing 
the production costs. Figure 4 shows the production cost line increased by the amount 
labeled "increase due to parking price." Notice that the increased length of the 
production cost line shifts the travel cost lines up, but does not have an effect on their 
slope. 
Notice also how the boundaries of the suburban firm's mru·ket area are now 
increased, as indicated by the dashed lines outside the old dotted lines. Simultaneously. 
of course, the market ru·ea of the central city firm has decreased. Leaving the exan1ple for 
a moment, this increase in the suburban firm's market area as a result of increasing 
parking prices helps explain why some firms would choose to move to a suburban 
location in the long run. 
To illustrate with some specific numbers, Dueker et al. estimate the effects of 
various changes in parking prices on the share of workers using transit in Portland. OR 
(12). They estin1ate that for a specified set of values for other variables in their model. a 
parking price of $20 per month would lead to a transit share of 12 percent for urban 
residents working downtown and 7 percent for suburban residents working downtown. 
Increasing the parking chru·ge to $100 per month while holding other factors constant 
would lead to an increase in transit share from 12 percent to 22 percent for urbru1 
residents working downtown, and from 7 percent to 20 percent for suburban residents 
working downtown. However, they estimate that even with these substantially higher 
charges, 60 percent of urban residents and 75 percent of suburban residents would still 
drive to work alone. 
The increase of almost $1,000 per year in parking charges for these workers 
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would be expected to have some effect on the wage differential between downtown and 
suburban locations; and the shifting wage differential would create an incentive for some 
downtown firms to relocate to the suburbs. The ultimate effect would depend on many 
factors, such as what is done with the additional parking revenue, who pays for the 
additional transit subsidies, and so on. However, the parking price increase alone would 
have the effect of a $1,000 per year tax on over 60 percent of downtown workers; and this 
ignores the effect that such an increase in parking charges might have on potential 
customers. 
Figure 5 illustrates a somewhat different scenario. Here, parking prices are 
increased for both the central city and the suburban firm. However, parking prices in the 
suburban location do not increase by as much as those in the central city location. This 
would be the case if a tax were imposed on parking revenues, for instance, because 
suburban parking charges are typically much lower than central city parking charges. if 
there are any charges at all. Note in this example how the increase in production costs for 
the suburban firm is less than the increase for the central city firm. While the suburban 
location's market area increases, it does not increase by as much as in the first scenario, 
where there was no increase in parking price and hence production costs. 
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Figure 4. Change in production costs and market areas due to 
increase in parking price. Parking prices, and hence production 
costs, increase only in the central city; the suburban location' s 














Figure 5. Change in production costs and market areas due to 
increase in parking price. Parking prices, and hence production 
costs, increase in both the central city and suburban location. 















Figure 6. Change in production costs and market areas due to 
increase in parking price. Parking prices increase by the same 
amount in both central city and suburban locations. 
In the final example, shown in Figure 6, parking prices are increased in both the 
central city and suburban location by the same amount. This would be the effect, for 
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example, of a regional tax per parking space (as opposed to parking revenues). Note that 
in this scenario, the market share for the suburban flffi1 does not change. In this case. the 
impact on the suburban fim1 is not differentially advantageous. 
In Figure 7, the egg-shaped circles represent the market areas for a submban firm, 
as determined by the production and travel costs under the fom different scenarios. The 
central city firm' s market area is represented by the entire gray portion~ in each case. the 
central city firm 's market is larger than the suburban firm's. But the extent of the 
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Figure 7. City center and suburban firm market areas, with differing 
levels of parking prices (13) . 
Scenario A in Figure 7 is the base case. Here, the central city firm - with its 
higher production costs and lower travel costs - has a larger market area than does the 
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suburban firm. In Scenario B, parking prices are increased for both the central city firm 
and the suburban firm; however, the increase in price to the suburban user is less than the 
increase in price for the central city user. This differential increase in prices paid by the 
user results over the long term in a slightly larger market area for the suburban furn. 
In Scenario C, parking prices are increased for the central city firm only, and not 
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at all for the suburban firm. As is clear from Figure 7, in this situation, the suburban firm 
gains a substantial share of the market, with the central city firm losing market area by a 
corresponding amount. 
The final case, Scenario D, is the one in which the parking price is increased by 
exactly the same amount for both central city and suburban locations. As is apparent, the 
effect on market areas is niJ, and the illustration is exactly the same as in the base case, 
Scenario A. 
The effect of the imposition of the tax only in the downtown (or at a higher rate 
there) can then be examined in the bid-rent fran1ework. The higher cost and smaller 
market area in the downtown will reduce the amow1t that each furn will bid for city 
locations while increasing the bid for suburban ones. In the long run, this would imply a 
shift of activity with some firms relocating to the suburbs. 
The above analysis presents one simplified example of the potential effects of 
replacing gasoline taxes with various types of parking taxes. Clearly there are many 
types of prices and charges that can affect costs and there are many possible uses of the 
revenue raised by such policies. This analysis is merely intended to show the possibility 
of adverse spatial effects from policies intended to affect short-run mode choice. 
Policymakers should not ignore the possibility of substantial differences between the 
short-run and long-run when they are designing and evaluating such policies. 
Careful evaluation of alternatives may allow for a policy that achieves the desired 
effect without disadvantaging the downtown location. For exan1ple, cashing out of 
employer-provided, free parking raises the opportunity cost of SOY commuting to 
downtown but lowers rather than raises the wage premiwn that workers would require for 
23 
working downtown. In this case, the worker still faces the full cost of parking, but the 
policy leads to an increase in income if parking is not used rather than a decrease in 
income if parking is used. While this will be important to the worker, it may still induce 
employers to move to the suburbs if they are forced to pay the higher cost. Hence, the 
determination of who finances any changes in commuting cost becomes important in 
determining the relative impact on city versus suburbs. Also, a parking policy that raises 
the cost of long-te1m or commuter parking may target employees without raising the 
parking costs for customers. 
Other policies can also be evaluated in terms of the short-run impact between city 
and suburbs as long as there is some clear differentiation of the cost. Policies that raise 
costs in some locations but not others or that offset cost increases with different uses of 
the revenue raised can certainly influence the impact of the policy. As has been :frequently 
noted, congestion pricing will actually lower the overall commute cost for those who 
value their time very highly. These people are willing to pay more than the congestion 
fee to reduce the time spent commuting. Hence, their combined time and money cost 
goes down as the lowered time cost more than offsets the higher money cost. 
The changes between money and time as costs of commuting are likely to lead to 
subtle changes in location patterns. For example, with higher money cost and lower time 
cost, there is likely to be more concentration of highly paid workers in the central city. 
Highly paid workers typically value their time more, and the relative shift will make the 
city a more attractive location. 
For policies that generate revenue, the use of that revenue may also have 
important implications for the outcome of the policy. For example, if the revenue from 
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the downtown parking tax were used to subsidize mass transit further, the core might be 
at less of a relative disadvantage than if the money were used to lower regional taxes. 
This might also offset the relative change in central city attraction for workers who value 
the money cost of parking fees more than the time savings from reduced congestion. 
They would have greater opportunities to trade off money for time by using the expanded 
mass transit system. While such a policy might not promote transportation efficiency, it 
might offset some of the distributional impacts of a downtown parking tax. 
CONCLUSION 
Effective evaluation of congestion pricing and parking policy will requjre a 
carefuJ analysis of the potential long-tenn effects of the policy changes on business 
location decisions. The policy must then be evaluated both using the monocentric model 
and the spatial competition model to detennine the changes in location incentives that are 
likely to be created. While the two models lead to similar conclusions in evaluating some 
policies, they have very different implications for others. In particular, spatial 
competition seems to be a very important factor for downtown business interests that is 
not widely discussed in the literature on congestion pricing and parking policy. 
There is a substantial body of literature that provides some insight into how 
changes in pricing are likely to affect mode choice; but this is essentially a short-run 
analysis that assumes fixed locations and fixed trip patterns. There is much less literature 
on the effect of transportation costs on the location of economic activity; and this is the 
type of analysis that is needed to understand the long-run implications of policies that 
substantially change relative costs of transpo1tation. 
This type of analysis is particularly important since most policies will have a 
spatially differentiated impact on transportation costs; and these differentiated policies 
can further affect location patterns. In particular, parking charges have received 
substantial interest due to their high potential to affect mode choice, but most such 
charges would be levied differentially on downtown locations. Hence, this policy has a 
clear potential to increase transit mode share in the short nm but to lead to 
decentralization of activity in the long run if there are not offsetting changes in other 
policies or in the use of the revenues. 
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Other policies, such as congestion pricing, also have the potential for unintended 
location consequences. To the extent that such policies have received any analysis with 
respect to location impact, it bas been based on the bid-rent analysis and has largely 
ignored issues of spatial competition. 
26 
Notes 
1. Dueker, K.J., Strathman, J.S., Bianco, M.J. , et al. "Strategies to Attract Auto Users to 
Transit." Prepared for the Transit Cooperative Research Program, Transportation 
Research Board, National Research Council. No. H-3 (1998). 
2. See, for example, Shoup, D. "Cashing in on Curb Parking." Access 4, Spring (1994) 
pp. 20-26. 
3. COMSIS Corp., 1990, Evaluation of Travel Demand Management 1\1/easures to 
Relieve CongesNon, prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 
Highway Administration, Washington, D.C., February. 
4. Shoup, D.C., "Cashing-Out Free Parking." Transportation Quarterly 36 (1982) p. 352. 
5. Kain, J., "Impacts of Congestion Pricing on Transit and Carpool Demand and 
Supply." In National Research Council, Transportation Research Board, 
Committee for Study on Urban Transportation Congestion Pricing, Curbing 
Gridlock: Peak-Period Fees to Relieve Traffic Congestion, Vol. 2. National 
Academy Press (1994), pp. 502-553. 
6. Downs, A., Stuck in Traffic: Coping with Peak-Hour Congestion. The Brookings 
Institution and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (1992) 210 pp. 
7. Christaller, W. Central Places in Southern Germany. Trans. C.W. Baskin. Englewood 
Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-Hal l [1933] (1994). 
8. Park, R.E., Burgess, E.W., and McKenzie, R. The City. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press (1925); Berry, B.J.L. , and Kasarda, J.D. Contempormy Urban 
Ecology. New York: Macmillan (1977). 
9. Solow, R.M., "Congestion Cost and the Use of Land for Streets." The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Autumn 1973), pp. 602-618. 
10. Sullivan, A.M., "The General Equil ibrium Effects of Congestion Externalities." 
Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 147, No. 1(July1983), pp. 80-104. 
J 1. Yinger, J., "Bumper to Bumper: A New Approach to Congestion in an Urban 
Model," Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2 (September 1993), pp. 249-
274. 
12. Dueker, K.J., Strathman, J.S., Bianco, M.J., et al. 
13. See, for example, Hoover, E.M., and Giarratani, F. An Introduction to Regional 
Economics. Alfred A. Knopf (1984) pp. 78-90. 
